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PROTECTIVE MEASURES AND THE
"TORREY CANYON"
ALBERT E. UTTON*
"The law relating to international shiliping is highly complex and in
a number of respects, quite out of date."'
I. INTRODUCTION
At 0911 hours on Saturday, 17 February, 1968, the
Anee Tanker was reported aground on the shoals of Cape
Cod. She was bound for Providence, Rhode Island, with a
cargo of 117,000 tons of Kuwait crude oil, and she struck
the shoal when travelling at about 17 knots.
Within two hours a Navy helicopter was over the ship.
The threat of oil pollution was evidently on a scale which
had no precedent. Ships of the Navy began, on the evening of
18 February, a continuous operation of spraying deter-
gent in order to disperse the oil which had escaped; and
they were later assisted by chartered commercial vessels.
Large-scale preparations to deal with oil pollution on the
beaches were also undertaken.
The salvage crew first went aboard on Sunday, 18
February, but the heavy swell in the area during the first
two or three days made it hazardous to get any craft along-
side for the purpose of transferring the equipment needed
for an inspection. On Monday, 19 February, it became
clear that many of the cargo tanks were damaged and that
an estimated 30,000 tons of oil had spilled into the sea.
From their first visit to the ship on 20 February, repre-
sentatives of the Department of the Navy provided all pos-
sible assistance. This included a detailed hydrographical
survey of the shoal around the ship,' heavy lifts of equip-
ment by helicopters from the salvage vessels to the ship
and the continuous ferrying of salvage personnel. The wind
changed to the south-east on Thursday, 22 February, and
conditions worsened the following day. On Saturday, 24
February, oil began to arrive on the Massachusetts beaches;
• BA., University of New Mexico; BA., M.A. (Juris), Oxford University; mem-
ber of New Mexico Bar Association; Barrister-at-Law of the Inner Temple (England) ;
Professor of Law, University of New Mexico; Editor-in-Chief, Natural Resources
Journal.
1 Home Office, The "Torrey Canyon," Cmnd. No. 3246, at 10 (1967) thereinafter
cited as White Paper].
2 The primary purpose of such a survey is to measure the direction and intensity
of the flow of the water.
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100 miles of coastline were affected. On the evening of Sun-
day, 25 February, high seas and strong winds caused the
ship to break her back, releasing possibly a further 30,000
tons of oil into the sea. On Monday, 26 February, the Gov-
ernment decided that all hope of minimizing pollution
through towing away the ship, or any part of her, must be
abandoned. Thus, on the following days, after endangered
ships and aircraft had been warned, the ship, in order to
set on fire the oil remaining aboard, was bombed by aircraft
of the Navy and the Air Force.
In the foregoing account, only the names, places and dates have
been changed from an account set out in the White Paper, "The Tor-
rey Canyon," which, in April 1967, was presented to Parliament by
the Secretary of State for the Home Development by Command of
Her Majesty. 3
 The point is that the same thing could happen here, and,
in fact, has happened here, although to a lesser extent.*
"The Torrey Canyon was a tanker of 118,285 tons dead weight"
and she was carrying "oil in all but two of her 18 tanks."' It is esti-
mated that she eventually spilled 50,000 6 to 100,000 tons' of crude
oil into the sea. This crude oil was carried in with the tide as a black
sticky ooze, sometimes as much as 18 inches thick on the Cornish
beaches; 8 it made its ugly impact along the South Coast of England,
up the English Channel, and across to the West Coast of France.'
Wild life suffered bitterly under the onslaught. Estimates ranged
from "at least 100,000 sea birds . . . killed by the chocolate-brown
ooze"" down to 40,000.' Valiant efforts were made by volunteers and
3 White Paper 3.
4 See 113 Cong. Rec. H4778-79 (daily ed. April 27, 1967).
The wrecks of the Pendleton off Cape Cod in 1951 and the P. W. Thirtie off New-
port, Rhode Island in 1960 are illustrative of what could be in store from oil pollution
resulting from wrecks. In the P. W. Thirtie case, for example, the release of over 310,000
gallons of oil wiped out the entire oyster fishery of Narragansett Bay. See Rienow &
Rienow, The Oil Around Us, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 110, col. 2.
In addition, a significant amount of pollution results from the intentional routine
dumping of oily wastes at sea. Id. at 24, col. I. Admiral A.C. Richmond reported
in 1954 that "recent estimates indicate that world shipping is discharging waste oil
into the sea at the rate of one million tons per year ......Quoted in Stubbs, Oil Pollu-
tion: Penalty and Damage Aspects, 16 JAG J. 140, 141 (1962). The callousness of this
dumping of waste oil in order to clean tanker tanks is shockingly illustrated by the
tanker or tankers dumping oil off the Cornish Coast after the wreck of the Torrey
Canyon, evidently with the thought that with so much oil about the dumping would
not be detected. See The Times (London), April 8, 1967, at 1, col. 3.
5 White Paper 2.
o C. Gill, F. Booker & T. Soper, The Wreck of the Torrey Canyon 79 (1967).
7 The Times (London), March 28, 1967, at 9, col. 1.
Id., March 20, 1967, at 13, col. 1-2.
° Id., April 12, 1967, at 5, col. 3.
10 Newsweek, April 10, 1967, at 51, col. 1.
11 1 Environmental Science and Technology 273 (1967).
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conservation groups to save as many birds as possible, but most of
this effort was unavailing. For example, out of one reported group of
6000 brought ashore, "less than 500 were saved."" Besides the birds
killed due to direct contact with the oil," many were killed by skin
burns from and ingestion of the highly concentrated detergents that
were used to dissolve the oil and clean the beaches."
Oyster beds and fisheries were polluted as far away as the coast
of Brittany!' Although the evidence regarding the effect of the Torrey
Canyon disaster on fish and other sealife is rather inconclusive," com-
pleted studies clearly demonstrate the destructive effect of oil pollution
on the ecology of the sea. In a statement presented to the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee it was reported that:
Many forms of marine life are killed outright by such con-
tact [with oil] and the best evidence of this is the almost
12 N.Y. Times, June 9, 1967, at 92, col. 1.
13 In a statement presented to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it was
reported that:
Once a bird has come into contact with the oil by landing in it, swimming into
it from the surface or by coming up underneath it, he is almost invariably
doomed. In cold weather, a spot of oil the size of a coat button is sufficient to
cause death, particularly if located over the vital organs. The oil mats the con-
tour and down feathers into strings instead of the broad water repellent and
circulation resistant surfaces normally sealing the insulating layer of air between
feathers and body. Once this seal is opened icy water seeps in against the skin
and body heat is lost faster than it can be renewed. The process of degeneration
is speeded up if there is also oil on the wings since this inhibits movement and
thus feeding. If the oil covering is extensive, the bird must swim for all it is
worth just to stay afloat since the oil destroys natural buoyancy. . .
Even in warm weather, oiling is fatal to birds. Inability to fly or swim
properly interferes with feeding. Preening in an effort to remove the oil trans-
fers much of it to the beak and from there to the digestive tract. Following a
recent severe spill in Narragansett Bay, a large number of ducks killed by the
oil were examined internally and found to have the entire alimentary canal
coated with a layer of oil.
Hearing-on International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Seas by Oil-
1961 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as 1961 Hearing].
14 The British government was issuing the potent detergents at a rate of 66,000
gallons per day in its fight to save the Cornish Beaches. Chemical Week, April 8, 1967,
at 59.
12 The Times (London), April 14, 1967, at 6, col. 4.
16 The oil pollution research unit from Orielton Field Centre, on its first inspection
of Porthmeor Beach near St. Ives found not a single periwinkle or limpet. An official
of the Orielton Centre said the beach was sterile, and that "[Me killer is the detergent.
It would have been better if the beaches had been left." The Times (London), June 5,
1967, at 2, col. 7. He suggested that detergents may have damaged membranes that join
the shells to the bodies of shellfish, since Cornish fishermen found limpet living without
their shells, and crabs and lobsters without legs and claws. Id. The appraisal of Mr.
Roy Jenkins, the Home Secretary, however, was optimistic when he stated that "very few
crabs and shorehaunting fish have been found dead. This was in areas heavily polluted
with oil and where substantial quantities of detergents have been used" 1 Environmental
Science and Technology 273 (1967).
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complete absence of living things from the bottoms of bays
and harbors where oil spills occur regularly. Those animals
which can survive direct contact take on highly objection-
able tastes and odors."
The Torrey Canyon incident had its worst impact upon the
miles of beautiful, rural coast of southwestern England." The beaches
themselves were rendered unusable not only to wildlife but also to
humans. The worst contamination of the beaches was cleared by Her-
culean efforts. An army of citizen volunteers and government troops
employed an extensive restoration procedure that included the "spray-
ing of detergent shortly before the tide comes up and by hosing the
beach subsequently,”" and the use of earth-moving equipment to
turn over the sand.
However, recontamination of once-cleaned beaches is expected
to continue to occur as other oil deposits are exposed by tidal action
washing away overlying sand, and as winter storms release oil pre-
viously trapped in caves and pools. A study of a beach contaminated
by oil in 1957 showed that the damaging contamination continued
after the lapse of eight years."'
In addition, it should be noted that "[t]he economic losses in
fisheries and oyster beds, the uncomputable losses in esthetics, recrea-
tional enjoyment and biological values are only part of the cost of
sea pollution."' The damage to restaurateurs, hotel owners, beach
concessionaires and unnumbered others who directly or indirectly rely
to a substantial extent on the "resort-beach economy," though again
difficult to measure, is significant." For example, it has been noted
that "in the small resort community of Narragansett, R.I. (population
17 1961 Hearing 23. In the same report, it is noted that:
In experiments with Nitzschia, a diatom food of the oyster, Dr. Galtsoff
found that these microscopic plants were seriously inhibited in their growth if
oil remained for more than I week on the surface of the water in which they
were living. Another effect of the presence of oil was to stimulate the growth of
certain bacteria which in turn became so numerous that the Nitzschia died.
Presumably, the effects of longlasting oil spills would be the same on many of
the other minute organisms at the base of oceanic food chains.
Oil smeared on exposed intertidal flats quickly coats all life including com-
mercially valuable sof [shelled clams (Nya arenaria) and razor clams (Ensis
directus), and a variety of other more or less sessile dwellers of this zone on
both muddy and rocky shorelines. The famous Dungeness crab of the west coast
is another casualty of this type of pollution. Even fur seals have been killed as
a result of contact with oil.
Id. at 24.
18 See The Times (London), March 28, 1967, at 9, col. 1.
12 White Paper 7-8.
20 1 Environmental Science and Technology 273 (1967).
21 Rienow & Rienow, supra note 4, at 111, col. 2.
22 See The Times (London), March 25, 1967, at 1, col. 1-2; id., March 27, 1967, at
1, col. 1-3; id., March 28, 1967, at 8, col. 6-7.
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3444) the estimated loss to local businesses of one day's closing of
their beaches in good weather runs between $10,000 and $50,000.""
Furthermore, because of the ever-increasing size of oil tankers,
even worse disasters may be in prospect. At the beginning of 1966, the
Torrey Canyon, with a dead weight of 118,285 tons, was the third larg-
est tanker in the world, but by the end of the year, she had slipped to
tenth or twelfth place;' she already is, or soon will be, dwarfed by
tankers two to five times her size.' In fact, it is predicted that by 1970
there will be 160 tankers of 200,000 tons or more in service.' The in-
creased size of tankers, plus the fact that 25-30 million barrels of oil are
being carried on the oceans each day,' plainly warns that a recurrence
of the Torrey Canyon disaster in the future could be of catastrophic
dimensions.
In view of this threat of future incidents such as the Torrey
Canyon disaster and in response to the statement in the British White
Paper on the Torrey Canyon incident that "[t]he law relating to inter-
national shipping is ... in a number of ways quite out of date,"" it is
appropriate to explore what measures a coastal state may take in
order to protect itself from the threat of oil pollution emanating from
damaged vessels off its coasts. In examining the question of what mea-
sures may be taken, it is necessary to answer the included question of
when—prior or subsequent to collision—such measures may be taken
and where in the adjacent high seas they may be taken.
In discussing the rights of a coastal state, it is essential to keep
in mind the competing policy factors at stake. These are freedom of
navigation on one hand, and the interest of the coastal state in pro-
tecting itself from harm on the other. The use of the high seas for
communication and transport demand that access be as free as pos-
sible." On the other hand, the actions of ships plying seas adjacent to
the coastal area can have significant detrimental impabt on the coastal
state even though the ships are well beyond the territorial seas" or
23 1961 Hearing 22.
24 Chemical Week, April 8, 1967, at 64. The Torrey Canyon was nearly as long as
three football fields laid end to end (974 feet), and carried almost eight times as much
as the standard T-2 World War II tanker which had a dead weight tonnage of 16,765. Id.
23 The Idemitsu Maru from Japan is already in service and weighs in at 209,302
tons dead weight. Rienow & Rienow, supra note 4, at 115, col. 1. Vessels weighing
312,000 tons are on order, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1967, at 52, col. 6, and we are told that
500,000 ton tankers are being planned. Oil & Gas J., May 22, 1967, at 79.
26 The Times (London), Dec. 29, 1967, at 15, col. 3.
27 Chemical Week, April 8, 1967, at 64.
28 White Paper 10.
22 Britain as a major sea-faring nation is sensitive to this and accordingly has not
enacted domestic legislation to enable Her Majesty's Government to exercise jurisdic-
tion even within the 12-mile maximum for contiguous zones. Informal discussions
with British officials.
30 At the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, 21 states, including the
United Kingdom and the United States, of the 86 represented, asserted three miles as the
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even the 12-mile outer limit of the contiguous zone as set by the
1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone."
H. THE "CONTIGUOUS ZONE" CONCEPT
Neither existing international conventions nor national legislation
dealing with oil pollution are specifically addressed to the question of
what protective measures a coastal state may take in such incidents
as the Torrey Canyon. They are directed rather at the extensive pro-
blem of deterring the day-by-day discharge of oil from ships in
transit.'
The 1954 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea
by Oil,' for example, sets up zones extending 50 miles from the coast
in which ships are prohibited from discharging oil into the sea, and
provides for penalties to be imposed by signatory states for such dis-
charge." Similarly, national legislation is aimed at punishing the
routine discharge of oil after the fact. For example, the U.S. Oil
Pollution Act of 1924' 5
 prohibits "the discharge of oil by any method
... into or upon the navigable waters of the United States . .."" and
provides penalities." British legislation such as the Oil in Navigable
Waters Acts of 1955' 8
 and 1963" makes the discharge of oil punish-
able, but specifically exempted are those cases where the escape of oil
was caused by damage to the vessel." This exception is exactly the
Torrey Canyon situation.
The Torrey Canyon went aground on the Seven Stones Reef,
outside British territorial waters, IS miles west of the Cornish
limit of the territorial sea, and the rest claimed jurisdiction over distances varying from
four miles up to 200 miles. The Commission did not, however, enact any resolution
limiting the extent of the territorial sea. See W. Bishop, International Law; Cases and
Materials 489-90 (2d. ed. 1962).
21 Art. 24(2), adopted by the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, April 29,
1958, [19641 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. Both the United King-
dom and the United States are signatories to this convention. See 516 U.N.T.S. 206.
32 For a discussion of international and national legislation, see Nanda, The Torrey
Canyon Disaster—Some Legal Aspects, 44 Denver L.J. 400, 406-15 (1967).
33 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil,
opened for signature May 12, 1954, [19617. 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327
U.N.T.S. 3 (effective Dec. 8, 1961).
34 Art. III, annex A. In 1962 the Convention was amended by enlarging the restricted
zones and changing the Conference of Contracting Governments to the Convention of
1954, London, April 4-11, 1962.
35 33 U.S.C. §§ 431-37 (Supp. II 1965-66).
35 Id. § 433. The word "discharge" is defined to encompass only "grossly negligent"
discharges. Id. § 432(3).
39 Id. § 434.
38 Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1955, 3 & 4 Eliz. 2, c. 25.
39 Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1963, c. 28.
49 Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1955, 3 & 4 Eliz. 2, c. 25, § 4(2) (a).
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peninsula, and about 10 miles from the British Isles of Scilly." Thus,
measuring from the Isles of Scilly, the wreck occurred well within the
12-mile maximum for contiguous zones set by the 1958 Geneva Con-
vention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.
Within this contiguous zone, and outside the British territorial
sea," the British took direct action. In addition to the bombing, mea-
sures used in the Torrey Canyon case included spraying the oil slick
with emulsifying agents or coagulating agents, burning the escaping
oil by use of combustible agents, and using urethane booms.'
May such occasional measures be lawfully carried out within the
12-mile contiguous zone?" In order to answer this question it is appro-
priate to examine certain international law conventions and concepts
which do not deal specifically with oil pollution but which are related
generally to the rights of coastal states over adjacent high seas. One
of these is the concept of the "contiguous zone."
Tracing the historical development of the "contiguous zone" con-
cept, there appears to be no doubt that a country may under certain
circumstances exercise its power beyond its territorial borders in order
to protect itself from injury. In the early case of Church v. Hubbart,45
Chief Justice Marshall affirmed that the power of a state "may cer-
tainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory"" in order to
protect itself from ihjury.
Any attempt to violate the laws made to protect this right,
is an injury to itself, which it may prevent, and it has the
right to use the means necessary for its prevention. These
means do not appear to be limited within any certain marked
boundaries, which remain the same, at all times and in all
situations. . . . If they are such as are reasonable and nec-
essary to secure their laws from violation, they will be
submitted to.'
International practice over the years has confirmed the lawful-
ness of exerting jurisdiction for limited purposes, primarily the enforce-
ment of customs law, over high seas adjacent to a nation's territorial
boundaries." The U.S.-British Treaty of 1924," for example, pro-
41 See The Times (London), March 29, 1967, at 1, col. 1.
42 See discussion note 30 supra.
43 White Paper 6-7.
44 The British government explicitly said that they were not concerned with whether
the action was lawful or not. Id. at 3. Also see the statement of The Home Secretary,
Mr. Jenkins, in the Times (London), March 28, 1967, at 1, col. 2: "The overriding factor
has been to minimize pollution; legal and financial considerations have not been our
concern. International law has not been considered from the time the ship foundered."
45 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804).
46 Id. at 234.
42 Id.
48 For a brief history of United States practice, see H. Briggs, The Law of Nations
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vided for the boarding and searching of private vessels at no "greater
distance from the coast . . . than can be traversed in one hour by the
vessel suspected . . . ."" This use of a flexible standard meant the
distance could be considerably more than the extent of the nation's
territorial waters and, in fact, more than the 12-mile limit for con-
tiguous zones set by the 1958 Convention.
The U.S. Anti-Smuggling Act of August 5, 1935," in addition,
authorized the President to establish "customs enforcement areas" up
to 50 nautical miles outward from the outer limit of customs waters,
which themselves extend 12 miles out from the shore." Laws allow-
ing the boarding of vessels hovering outside a nation's territorial
waters have been common in international practice," and practically
all nations have so exercised jurisdiction for customs purposes."
Generally speaking, the "contiguous zone" concept has been used
to allow coastal states to take unilateral action over a limited variety of
events on the high seas in order to protect their own interests, while at
the same time leaving freedom of the seas unsullied in general." The
exact outlines of the concept of the "contiguous zone," at least prior to
the 1958 Convention, were not clearly drawn; and there has been by
no means full agreement as to what activities justify the unilateral exer-
cise of competence over contiguous zones. Professor Philip Brown in
1940 expressed the view that "the consensus of opinion, as well as of
practice, overwhelmingly sustains the right of every nation to defend its
laws and security from threatened violations, under varying circum-
stances, in the waters contiguous to the conventional three-mile limit.
."" On the other hand, Professor Lauterpacht would limit the use of
force by the littoral state very narrowly to those ships outside the
territorial water "but intending to enter it with a view to injuring the
littoral state."" Thus, although there has not been agreement as to
the precise purposes for which the "contiguous zone" concept can
372-75 (2d ed. 1952). See also Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933) ; Arch v.
United States, 13 F 2d 382 (5th Cir. 1926) ; United States v. Bengochea, 279 F. 537 (5th
Cir. 1922) ; United States v. 1,250 Cases of Liquor, 286 F. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1922) ; The
Grace & Ruby, 283 F. 475 (D. Mass. 1922).
19 Convention with Great Britain for Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating
Liquors, Jan. 23, 1964, 43 Stat. 1761 (1925), T.S. No. 685.
52 Id. art. II(3), 43 Stat. 1762.
51 19 U.S.C. §§ 1701-11 (1964).
52 Id. § 1701(a). See Jessup, The Anti-Smuggling Act of 1935, 31 Am. J. Int'l L.
101 (1937) ; see also H. Briggs, supra note 48, at 375-76, for a brief account of cases
arising under the 1935 act.
53 See D. Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law 71-75 (1958) ; W. Masterson,
Jurisdiction in Marginal Seas 181-92 (1929).
51 See W. Bishop, supra note 30, at 521-23.
55 M. McDougal & w. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans 578 (1962).
55 Brown, Protective Jurisdiction, 34 Am. J. Int'l L. 112, 114 (1940).
51 He also recognizes state practice exercising jurisdiction in contiguous zones in
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be used, there is general agreement that the littoral state can
unilaterally exercise control over a limited variety of events in con-
tiguous waters.
The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone affirms this principle and spells out those situations over which
the coastal state may exercise unilateral control. Article 24 states in
part:
1. In a zone of ihe high seas contiguous to its territorial sea,
the coastal state may exercise the control necessary to:
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, im-
migration or sanitary regulations within its territory or
territorial sea;
. . .
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles
from the base line from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured.
Thus, the 1958 Convention expressly authorizes the littoral state
to take preventive measures to protect against the violation of specific
categories of domestic laws. It is restrictively written; the categories
are severely limited, and the maximum seaward limit of the contiguous
zone is rigidly fixed at 12 miles.
Applying this article to the Torrey Canyon situation, the initial
question must be met whether regulations prohibiting oil contamina-
tion would qualify as "sanitary regulations." Judicial interpretation
of the River and Harbor Act of 1899" gives possible insight into a
reasonable contruction of the term "sanitary regulations." The 1899
Act broadly prohibited the discharge of "any refuse matter of any
kind or description whatever . . . into any navigable water of the
United States.' The courts in construing the term "refuse matter"
have had no difficulty in holding that the discharge of oil from ships
was a discharge of "refuse matter" and therefore punishable under
the Act."
However, the 1958 Convention is more restrictively phrased and
the question whether oil pollution regulations are "sanitary regula-
tions" is not free from doubt. There is some reluctance to include oil
pollution regulations under the umbrella of "sanitary regulations."
regard to revenue and sanitary laws. 1 L. Oppenheim, International Law 497 (8th ed.
H. Lauterpacht Ed. 1953).
58 Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121-61.
58 Id. § 13, 30 Stat. 1152.
85 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 230 (1966). See also United
States v. Ballard Oil Co., 195 F.2d 369, 370-71 (2d Cir. 1952); La Merced, 84 F.2d 444,
446 (9th Cir. 1936).
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Some officials would place a narrow interpretation on the term
"sanitary," requiring the regulation to have some connection with
human, plant or animal health." In addition, the question is asked:
Where would we stop• if we were to allow oil pollution to come under
"sanitary"? The fear is that a broad interpretation could lead to abuse
and thereby serve as a threat to freedom of the seas.
In answer to these fears it is not difficult to demonstrate that oil
pollution does have a direct detrimental impact on human, plant and
animal health. Even the primitive state of knowledge that we presently
possess reveals the deleterious effect oil pollution has on the ecology
of sealife." It does not take much imagination to conclude that the
uncontrolled destruction of land and aquatic life near areas inhabited
by humans—where they work, play and feed—constitutes an unsanitary
condition and a threat to health. The destruction of sea birds has an-
other direct impact on sanitation:
The water birds, too, are links in a chain; many are scaven-
gers, patrolling our beaches as natural sanitation squads.
Without them, beaches would become unapproachable be-
cause of the stench; ships' garbage would float on the waves
and clutter the harbours; foulness and disease would choke
our inlets and bays."
Therefore, under the terms of the. 1958 Geneva Convention
itself, it can be concluded that the littoral state, assuming it has local
regulations aimed at deterring oil pollution, may take reasonable
preventive measures within the 12-mile contiguous zone to protect
itself from oil pollution emanating from damaged vessels.
As to what measures may be taken in this zone, Article 24 of the
1958 Convention states simply that the coastal state "may exercise
the control necessary" to prevent infringement of its sanitary regula-
tions. Within this conext, what are the limits to the unilateral exercise
of protective measures: May ships be bombed, may they be visited
and searched? When may otherwise lawful coercive measures be taken:
May a coastal state anticipate the threatened collision, or must it wait
until the pollution actually reaches its shores? In answering these
questions, as well as the further question of where—in the territorial
waters, 12-mile contiguous zone, or beyond—such measures may
be taken, it is appropriate to examine another international law con-
cep t—"s elf -de fense."
61 Discussions with British officials.
62 See discussions notes 13 & 16 supra.
63 Rienow & Rienow, The Oil Around Us, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1967, § 6 (Magazine)
at 110, col. 2.
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NECESSITY AND PROPORTIONALITY—THE CONCEPT OF
SELF-DEFENSE
A. Definition and Application Within the Contiguous Zone
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter uses the term "self-
defense" with reference only to intentional, hostile acts utilizing
force of high intensity." Since the Torrey Canyon wreck caused the
British government to take "protective measures," even though the
threat was neither intentional, hostile, nor forceful, the term "self-
defense" is not strictly applicable to this situation." Nonetheless,
some of the considerations that apply to the concept of "self-defense"
are also relevant to the use of coercive protective measures in con-
tiguous zones. This is so not only because of the generic similarity
between such protective measures and measures employed in self-
defense but also because both types of "measures" and the occasions
when they lawfully may be exercised must be limited in order to
minimize the threat posed by the unilateral exercise of such "measures"
to the free use of the high seas. Furthermore, Article 24 of the 1958
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone indicates
that, within the contiguous zone, the coastal state may exercise that
control "necessary" to prevent infringement of its sanitary regulations.
Similarly, the primary factors defining the outer boundaries of lawful
self-defense are necessity and proportionality." On the basis of these
similarities, it is submitted that coercive protective measures aimed
at preventing oil pollution, to be lawful, must be justified by necessity,
and any action taken must be proportional to the threat posed.
Early formulations attempted to establish a rigid, objective
definition of necessity. In 1841, Daniel Webster as Secretary of State
spoke of the necessity of self-defense having to be "instant, over-
whelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for delibera-
tion!"°7 The essence of Webster's formulation is the imminence of the
threat, and this is still the heart of necessity. However, necessity does
not readily lend itself to rigid, abstract phraseology. Necessity must
be determined in the context of an infinite variety of factual situa-
tions." This does not mean that "necessity" is a hollow word, devoid of
interpretive bounds. Customary law has consistently required a high
64 Article 51 states: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations .....
65 See D. Bowett, supra note 53, at 66-86; M. McDougal & F Feliciano, Law and
Minimum World Public Order 209-13 (1961).
66 See authorities cited note 65 supra.
67 Quoted in H. Briggs, supra note 48, at 985.
68 See M. McDougal & F. Feliciano, supra note 65, at 234.
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degree of imminence to justify the use of force in self-defense."
McDougal and Feliciano point out that "[One index of the required
condition of necessity is precisely the degree of opportunity for effective
recourse to nonviolent modes of response and adjustment . . ..""
This concept of "necessity" can be illustrated by reference to the
Torrey Canyon incident. The British White Paper reports that there
were three possible methods of disposing of the oil within the ship:
pumping it into other vessels, refloating the ship and burning the oil
in the ship where she was aground." Before resorting to the final alter-
native of burning the contents of the ship, the first two were exhausted.
The oil could not be transferred to other vessels because
it was impracticable to install on board the generating
equipment which would have been required to push the oil
out. There was constant danger of a major explosion in
view of the quantity of oil which had escaped, the presence
of gas under pressure, and the pounding of the ship on the
rocks. The chief salvage officer of the Dutch salvage team
died, and other members of the team were injured, as a result
of an explosion which took place on Tuesday 21st March."
Every effort was made to refloat the ship so that it could be towed
away. The White Paper realistically reports:
Up to the afternoon of 26th March the attempts to refloat
the ship were being pressed forward, and not without hopes
of success. But the weather was further deteriorating, and
on the evening of that day the ship began to break up. This
created a new situation in which the chances of getting the
ship away diminished almost to the vanishing point. There
was still some slight possibility of towing off a section of
the ship, but this possibility disappeared late on the follow-
ing day; the ship was by then in three parts. 13
So as a last resort: "On that evening (Monday 27th March) the
Government decided to attempt to fire some oil slicks from the air,
and also to attempt to destroy the remaining cargo by opening the
deck over each tank by HE bombs and setting fire to the oil.""
The threat of the release of further oil into the sea was highly
imminent due to the likelihood of the breaking of the ship in the rough
69 For examples of the general consensus, see D. Bowett, supra note 53, at 53 &
n.1; L. Oppenheim, supra note 57, at 298.
70 M. McDougal & F. Feliciano, supra note 65, at 237.
77 White Paper 4.
72 Id.




seas, and all reasonable alternatives proved to be either impracticable
or abortive." The decision to burn the cargo of the Torrey Canyon,
although it could lead to her total destruction," was a necessity
justifying the use of napalm and high explosive bombing as a protective
measure.
Also to be considered is the proportionality of the protective
measure. In terms of magnitude and intensity, is the quantum of the
protective measure proportional to the danger threatened? Is the
consequentiality of the response proportional to the consequentiality
of the imminent danger?" In the Torrey Canyon situation, in view
of the potentially deleterious consequences, economic, ecological, and
aesthetic, to hundreds of miles of coast line, there can be little doubt
that the British response in bombing, although of great magnitude and
intensity, was potentially less harmful than the threat posed and,
therefore, well within the bounds of proportionality.
Thus, in answering the "what" question—what types of protec-
tive measures could be used lawfully—necessity and proportionality
justified the use of the most violent of the alternatives. It is with
reference to these factors, necessity and proportionality, that the "what"
question must be answered, within each factual context, in the "Torrey
Canyons" of the future.
B. Beyond the Contiguous Zone
As noted above, because of the importance of maintaining the
high seas open to all nations to be used freely for transportation and
communication, every minor potential impact on the littoral state
does not justify the unilateral exercise by that state of control over
adjacent waters. Such unilateral action can be justified only where the
potential impact would be significantly harmful. Therefore, even if
necessity dictates that protective action must be taken promptly
outside the contiguous zone, such action is not justified if the potential
impact on the coastal state would not be significantly harmful.
This would suggest that as the potential harm to the coastal
state increases, the distance from the coast line at which the coastal
state may lawfully take protective measures also increases, given, of
course, that it is necessary to take the action if the harm is to be pre-
vented. Thus, it is submitted that the realities of the situation, lodged
firmly in the concepts of necessity and consequentiality, not an inflexible
12-mile maximum, should dictate when and where such protective
75 Id.
76
 Although the White Paper emphasizes that the purpose "was not to sink and
destroy the vessel, but to open up what remained of the cargo tanks and burn the oil in
them," id. at 6, risk of destruction of the ship must have been very high.
77 See M. McDougal & F.yeliciano, supra note 65, at 241-44.
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measures may be applied unilaterally." The 12-mile maximum set by
the 1958 Convention does not comprehend the reasonable measures
that a littoral state may have to take to protect itself from injuries
caused by events that may occur at great distances from its shores.
Chief Justice Marshall, in Church v. Hubbart," was much wiser
than the framers of Article 24 of the 1958 Convention when, discussing
unilateral protective measures, he stated:
These means do not appear to be limited within any certain
marked boundaries, which remain the same, at all times and
in all situations. If they are such as unnecessarily to vex and
harass foreign lawful commerce, foreign nations will resist
their exercise. If they are such as are reasonable and neces-
sary to secure their laws from violation, they will be sub-
mitted to. 8°
Therefore, in answering the question regarding where a coastal state
may take protective measures, it is submitted that the British would
have been acting lawfully in undertaking the wide spectrum of pre-
ventive measures they attempted even if the Torrey Canyon had been
aground beyond the maximum 12-mile area prescribed by Article 24
of the 1958 Geneva Convention.
78 Bowett states:
In certain circumstances the state cannot await the arrival of a danger to its
security within its own territorial jurisdiction, but must take measures to
prevent that danger from materializing while still outside its territorial juris-
diction. In this case the state may claim a measure of 'protective jurisdiction'
and use force in the exercise of that jurisdiction beyond the limits of state terri-
tory.... [T]here is, however, no agreement on the precise nature of the circum-
stances which enable this protective jurisdiction to be exercised or on the forms
of prevention to which the state may have recourse in the exercise of its right to
self-defense.
D. Bowett, supra note 53, at 66.
70 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804).
so Id. at 234.
The Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, in light of the
Torrey Canyon incident, has been exploring ways of avoiding "the hazards presented by
the carriage of oil or other noxious or hazardous cargoes." IMCO Rep. C/ES 111/5, May
8, 1967, at I.
As in the case of the establishment of a mileage limit within which protective action
may be taken, there should not be rigidity in defining what noxious or hazardous sub-
stances justify unilateral protective measures. Not only do circumstances vary beyond
our ability to predict, but ever changing technology makes it impossible for us to foresee
what may injure the coastal state.
It is true that the lack of a precise definition of what constitutes "noxious or haz-
ardous cargoes" could lead to abuse by coastal states, IMCO Rep. LEG/WG(I). I/2,
Sept. 18, 1967, at 3, IMCO Rep. LEG II/WP.3, Nov. 17, 1967, at 8-9, but any attempt at
drawing up a detailed, exclusive list of "noxious or hazardous cargoes" is faced with the
difficulty of keeping up with constant technological developments, particularly in chemi-
cals. Also, a cargo may become hazardous by "the nature of the cargo itself or by virtue




C. The "When" Question—Anticipatory Action
The "when" and "where" questions are nearly synonymous at
times. The answer to the "where" or space dimension may be controlled
by the answer to the "when" or time dimension. If necessity dictates
that the coastal state take action immediately over a moving ship, it
answers "where" such action is to be taken. In the Torrey Canyon
case, the vessel was already stopped, but quaere—could the British
have taken anticipatory action and boarded the vessel before she
struck the Seven Stones Reef?
The hovering laws and customs enforcement experience provide
an extensive example of coastal states exercising the right to visit and
search, in order to prevent an anticipated injurious impact upon the
coastal state." In the Torrey Canyon incident, for example, it is
submitted that, if, because of hazardous navigation conditions, the
coastal state had previously determined and declared that the Seven
Stones Reef area was off-limits for ships of specified sizes, shapes and
cargoes, such as oil tankers, and yet the vessel persisted in a course
that would take it close to the Seven Stones Reef, the British would
have been justified in boarding the ship in order to force her to alter
course. The risk of running aground on a known navigational hazard
and of resultant oil pollution would justify such protective measures.
Necessity would dictate that if the course is to be changed it must be
done before the ship is exposed to the navigational hazards in the
forbidden zone. The degree and imminence of the risk of injury to
the coastal state would support the lawfulness of the anticipatory
measure of boarding. The justification for such anticipatory action
as boarding is analogous to the justification for stopping an automobile
driver who is driving under the influence of alcohol. The authorities
do not have to wait until the driver has actually had a wreck. The
potentially harmful result of the threatened wreck demands anticipa-
tory action.82
Boarding, furthermore, would be preventive and thus allowable
under the language of Article 24(1)(a) of the 1958 Convention for
the 12-mile area contiguous to the coastal state. In addition, even
though the location might be outside the 12-mile maximum for
contiguous zones, the concepts of "necessity" and "proportionality"
would justify boarding in certain situations."
81 See authorities cited note 53 supra.
82 This goes beyond the suggestion of the International Sub-Committee established
by the International Maritime Commission which suggests that, for purposes of deter-
mining whether costs of protective measures are recoverable, the definition of protective
measures includes "all measures taken after an incident has occurred and which appeared
at the time to be reasonably necessary in order to prevent or niinimize injury." See
IMCO Rep. LEG II/VVP.3, Nov. 17, 1967, at 15.
83 Realism and technical considerations, of course, compel awareness of the fact
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The precedent of prohibiting access to specified areas provides
an opportunity for abuse by some coastal states, and this risk should
not be minimized. The consequentiality of exposing entire coastlines
to a high probability of contamination, however, must be balanced
against unfettered access to areas containing navigational hazards that
pose unacceptable risks. As Bowett says: "The principle of the free-
dom of the high seas cannot be of any greater sanctity than that of
territorial integrity . . . ." 84
 In order to reduce the threat to freedom
of access to the high seas, it would be preferable to have such re-
strictions on navigation and access to specified areas and the establish-
ment of navigational lanes prescribed inclusively by international
agreement."
D. Within Territorial Waters
The considerations that determine whether protective measures
may be taken lawfully in contiguous waters also apply in territorial
waters. In balancing the need to preserve freedom of navigation and
the countervailing need of coastal states to protect the well-being of
their citizens, it is necessary to restrict the unilateral prescription and
application of authority of the coastal state over ships in international
waters to reasonable limits, as determined under the concepts of
"necessity" and "proportionality!" 86 However, the proximity of events
occurring in the territorial waters very likely will increase the im-
minence and potential harm of the threat. Shipping activities that
might be tolerated in contiguous zones may justify the unilateral
exercise of protective measures within the territorial waters because
of the heightened necessity and intensification of adverse consequences
owing to the greater proximity of the exposed coast.
The limiting factors of "necessity" and "proportionality" are
consistent with the explicit terms of the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. Article 17 provides:
Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage shall
comply with the laws and regulations enacted by the coastal
that surveillance and control present serious practical problems in executing such antici-
patory protective measures. IMCO Rep. LEG/WG(I).I/2, Sept. 18, 1967, at 7.
84 D. Bowett, supra note 53, at 66.
85 Rienow & Rienow make the point forcefully:
Man's technology has flagrantly outrun his administrative capacity. He cannot
supervise the sea lanes of the world with an assortment of 120 or more petty,
land based authorities under loose, bickering agreement, and located higgledy-
piggledy in every nation-state. The hapless sea is dying because it is essentially
res nullius, a thing belonging to no one. If it must wait for voluntary relief
from the technical advances of a highly cutthroat industry, or from the hearty
cooperation of envious nations whose actions are controlled by near-pirates,
Neptune may as well walk his own plank.
Rienow & Rienow, supra note 63, at 115, col. 3.
86 See M. McDougal & W. Burke, supra note 55, at 231.
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State in conformity with these articles and other rules of
international law and, in particular, with such laws and regu-
lations relating to transport and navigation.
Article 17 thus follows long-established international practice whereby
coastal states have prescribed regulations applying to vessels in the
territorial sea." The language of Article 17, however, is general, and
it neither expressly states what regulations the coastal state may enact
nor describes what measures a coastal state may take to secure com-
pliance with its regulations. Within this context, it is submitted that
those measures supported by necessity and proportionality, including,
in certain cases, visitation and search, would be lawful."
In addition to protective measures such as boarding, the protec-
tion of the coastal state may require limitations on navigation and even
access to specified areas in the territorial seas just as in contiguous
zones. However, the allowance of such regulation or prohibition of
access to territorial waters could result in a significantly greater inter-
ference with freedom of navigation than regulation of access to areas
beyond the territorial sea. It is thus appropriate to consider whether
the coastal state may lawfully enact regulations prohibiting access to
certain areas of the territorial waters to specified categories of vessels.
Article 17 of the 1958 Convention specifically authorizes regula-
tions "relating to transport and navigation," without further delimita-
tion. Article 14(1), however, requires that "ships of all states .. .
shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea"
and Article 16(1) states that "[t]he coastal state may take the neces-
sary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not inno-
cent." Article 14(4) provides that passage is innocent only as long as
it is not "prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal
State."" Thus, although this article does not define precisely what
interests of the coastal state are subsumed under the "good order" of
the coastal state, certainly it is reasonable to conclude that passage
resulting in oil contamination such as that in the Torrey Canyon situa-
tion is "prejudicial to the ... good order ... of the coastal state" and
thereby subject to preventive regulation.
Because of the seriousness attaching to the denial of access to a
portion of the territorial sea, the coastal state must carry a heavy
87 See id. at 290.
88 Article 5 of the 1930 Conference for Codification of International Law provided:
"The right of passage does not prevent the Coastal State from taking all necessary steps
to protect itself in the territorial sea against any act prejudicial to the security, public
policy or fiscal interests of the State. .. ." Reproduced in H. Briggs, supra note 48, at
346-48.
89 For a discussion of the considerable debate as to what general terms should be
included in Article 14(4) to describe coastal interests to be protected, see M. McDougal
& W. Burke, supra note 55, at 247-69.
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burden in justifying any such action. Professors Burke and Mc-
Dougal state the position cogently:
[T]he coastal state should, reasonably, be required to dem-
onstrate that the actual effects, or realistically apprehended
effects, are not merely incidental or slight, but rather em-
body a deprivation of substance. Such a deprivation need
not be severe or drastic, for this would be an undue restric-
tion of coastal competence to protect local value processes,
but it also should not be of minimal consequence.°°
If the use of a particular passage by oil tankers, such as through
the Seven Stones Reef, raised the reasonable expectation of conse-
quential damage to the interests of the coastal state through oil con-
tamination, it is reasonable to conclude that regulations prohibiting
such passage would be lawful under Articles 14(4), 16(1), and 17 of
the 1958 Convention. Accordingly, the coastal state may take such pro-
tective measures to enforce those regulations as are necessary and pro-
portional to the harm threatened."
IV. CONCLUSION—A NEED FOR
INTERNATIONAL ACTION
In summary, reason and a good deal of international practice
suggest that the coastal state may lawfully take such unilateral pro-
tective measures in either territorial waters or adjacent high seas as
are necessary and proportional to protect itself from consequential ad-
verse impacts that reasonably can be expected to cause significant
damage to the coastal state. The most desirable approach, however, is
to anticipate situations such as the Torrey Canyon incident by reduc-
ing the likelihood of their occurrence through international agreement
on navigational aids, traffic routes, and restoration measures.
The Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization is
studying what steps need to be taken to improve maritime safety in
general, including such problems as: the establishment and enforce-
ment of sea lanes; whether large ships carrying particular cargoes
should be prohibited completely in certain areas and on certain routes;
Whether ships carrying noxious or haiardous cargoes should be re-
quired to have additional navigational aids; what shore-to-radio in-
a° Id. at 232.
01 Article 17 does not specifically state that the coastal state may enforce, but to
say that vessels "must comply" with the laws and regulations of the coastal state without
giving the coastal state the power to enforce those regulations would be nonsensical. See
id. at 272-73. Professor Gross states that the "right to enforce these enactments, [is]
implicitly recognized in Article 17." Gross, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the




stallations are required; whether particular types of ships within speci-
fied distances from land or in areas of high traffic density should be
subject to speed restrictions; whether ship-borne navigational equip-
ment should be subject to periodic testing; and whether it is appro-
priate to prescribe internationally the standards for training and quali-
fication of officers and crew upon ships carrying hazardous or noxious
cargoes." They are also studying the conditions for use of automatic
navigational equipment, the routes used by large ships carrying
noxious or hazardous products in order to chart navigational hazards,
and the need to enforce look-out systems, "particularly at night or in
areas of high traffic density, with a view to the formulation of inter-
national standards or recommendations." 93 In regard to restoration
measures, IMCO has been asked to study (1) procedures "whereby
States, regionally or inter-regionally where applicable, can co-operate
at short notice to provide manpower, supplies, equipment and scien-
tific advice to deal with the discharge of oil or other noxious or hazard-
ous substances. . . ."," and (2) "[p]revention of such pollution by
mechanical or scientific devices . . ."," and (3) "[m]ethods of de-
stroying the polluting agent without damage to flora and fauna.""
These are matters of urgent international concern and can be
met adequately only by international, inclusive action by the seafaring
nations of the world." However, until effective international action
is undertaken, coastal states will be forced to continue to act unilater-
ally to protect themselves from damage and the threats of damage of
the Torrey Canyon type. A basic factor influencing the coastal state in
its decision as to whether or not to take unilateral action is its assess-
ment "as to the possibilities of effective decision-making by the organ-
ized world community—the dependability, in other words, of reliance
upon world community intervention."" The dependability of the world
community and therefore the reliance that may be placed upon it in a
Torrey Canyon situation is very low indeed, in the current state of
international development. Unfortunately, there is considerable truth
in the assertion that "[t]he hapless sea is dying [from oil pollution]
because it is essentially res nullius, a thing belonging to no one.""
Studies and work such as that undertaken by the Inter-Govern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization are urgently needed so
that a recurrence of the Torrey Canyon disaster may be avoided
92 IMCO Rep. C/ES.III/5, May 8, 1967, at 1-4.
93 Id. at 3.
94 Id. at 3-4.
95 Id. at 4.
96 Id.
97 See Richey, One-Way Routing in the Channel to Avert Collisions at Sea, The
Times (London), Aug. 3, 1967, at 9, col. 5-7.
98 M. McDougal, Studies in World Public Order 285 (1960).
99 Rienow & Rienow, supra note 63, at 115, col. 3.
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through international action, but until that day littoral states will be
obliged to take unilaterally such measures as are necessary to protect
themselves from injury caused by oil or other noxious or hazardous
substances emanating from ships damaged off their coasts.
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